Do Not Fear Your Opponent: Suboptimal Changes of a Prevention Strategy when Facing Stronger Opponents

Autor/inn/en	Slezak, Diego Fernandez; Sigman, Mariano
Titel	Do Not Fear Your Opponent: Suboptimal Changes of a Prevention Strategy when Facing Stronger Opponents
Quelle	In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141 (2012) 3, S.527-538 (12 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0096-3445
DOI	10.1037/a0025761
Schlagwörter	Decision Making; Reaction Time; Accuracy; Games; Prevention; Adjustment (to Environment) + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Decision-making; Entscheidungsfindung; Reaktionsvermögen; Game; Spiel; Spiele; Prävention; Vorbeugung
Abstract	The time spent making a decision and its quality define a widely studied trade-off. Some models suggest that the time spent is set to optimize reward, as verified empirically in simple-decision making experiments. However, in a more complex perspective compromising components of regulation focus, ambitions, fear, risk and social variables, adjustment of the speed-accuracy trade-off may not be optimal. Specifically, regulatory focus theory shows that people can be set in a promotion mode, where focus is on seeking to approach a desired state (to win), or in a prevention mode, focusing to avoid undesired states (not to lose). In promotion, people are eager to take risks increasing speed and decreasing accuracy. In prevention, strategic vigilance increases, decreasing speed and improving accuracy. When time and accuracy have to be compromised, one can ask which of these 2 strategies optimizes reward, leading to optimal performance. This is investigated here in a unique experimental environment. Decision making is studied in rapid-chess (180 s per game), in which the goal of a player is to mate the opponent in a finite amount of time or, alternatively, time-out of the opponent with sufficient material to mate. In different games, players face strong and weak opponents. It was observed that (a) players adopt a more conservative strategy when facing strong opponents, with slower and more accurate moves, and (b) this strategy is suboptimal: Players increase their winning likelihood against strong opponents using the policy they adopt when confronting opponents with similar strength. (Contains 5 figures and 1 footnote.) (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10