Paying for Better Test Scores

Autor/in	Eisenkopf, Gerald
Titel	Paying for Better Test Scores
Quelle	In: Education Economics, 19 (2011) 4, S.329-339 (11 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0964-5292
DOI	10.1080/09645290903546330
Schlagwörter	Foreign Countries; High School Students; Grade 11; Educational Testing; Performance Based Assessment; German; International Programs; Incentives; Context Effect; Student Behavior; Guessing (Tests); Switzerland; Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Ausland; High school; High schools; Student; Students; Oberschule; Schüler; Schülerin; Studentin; School year 11; 11. Schuljahr; Schuljahr 11; Leistungsermittlung; Deutscher; Anreiz; Student behaviour; Schülerverhalten; Erraten; Schweiz
Abstract	The paper investigates if the provision of financial incentives has an impact on the performance of students in educational tests. The analysis is based on data from an experiment with high school students who answered multiple-choice items from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). As in TIMSS, the setup did not discourage students from guessing. Students with a salary based on individual performance did not score significantly better than students with a fixed payout or a payout based on the performance of the entire group. However, incentives have an impact. The group with individualized payments showed significantly more guessing activities than the others. (Contains 4 notes, 7 tables, and 1 figure.) (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 325 Chestnut Street Suite 800, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Fax: 215-625-2940; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10