Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment

Autor/inn/en	Greene, Joshua D.; Morelli, Sylvia A.; Lowenberg, Kelly; Nystrom, Leigh E.; Cohen, Jonathan D.
Titel	Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment
Quelle	In: Cognition, 107 (2008) 3, S.1144-1154 (11 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0010-0277
DOI	10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004
Schlagwörter	Value Judgment; Cognitive Processes; Moral Development; Schemata (Cognition); Theories; Intuition; Emotional Response + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Werturteil; Cognitive process; Kognitiver Prozess; Moralische Entwicklung; Cognition; Schema; Kognition; Theory; Theorie; Emotionales Verhalten
Abstract	Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically. (Author).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10