Recognizing Differences

Autor/in	Solmon, Lewis C.
Titel	Recognizing Differences
Quelle	In: Education Next, 5 (2005) 1, S.16-20 (5 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	1539-9664
Schlagwörter	Student Improvement; Teacher Salaries; Public Education; College Credits; Academic Achievement; Merit Pay; Teacher Effectiveness; Teaching Skills; Teacher Influence; Academic Standards; Achievement Gains; Incentives + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Lehrerbesoldung; Lehrervergütung; Öffentliche Erziehung; College; Colleges; Achievement; Performance; Anrechnung; Hochschule; Fachhochschule; Leistung; Schulleistung; Leistungszulage; Effectiveness of teaching; Instructional effectiveness; Lehrerleistung; Unterrichtserfolg; Lehrbefähigung; Lehrkompetenz; Unterrichtsbefähigung; Achievement gain; Leistungssteigerung; Anreiz
Abstract	For more than a century, public education has worked under a single salary schedule that compensates teachers for college credits, education degrees, and years of experience, but not for their effectiveness in the classroom. In fact, research shows that the degrees, courses, and experience that teachers have, beyond the first few years of teaching, are unrelated to how much their students achieve. The current salary schedule does not normally take into account the fact that teachers work in schools offering different levels of nonmonetary benefits, such as a safe, pleasing environment. Nor does it recognize that students come to class with different levels of preparation and home support. In this article, the author makes the case for rewarding better teachers with more money. The author states that teachers should be rewarded for producing useful student outcomes, most notably, student learning gains, measured by value-added standards (i.e., improvement) rather than by levels of achievement at the end of a course. This method takes into account differences in where students start as well as differences in out-of-school factors that teachers cannot control. Looking at gains rather than levels of achievement also adjusts for the fear that performance pay will make all teachers want to teach the highest-achieving kids. When student improvement is rewarded, there may be financial benefits to teaching students who have the longest way to go--it may be easier to get a 25 percentile gain from someone starting at the 30th percentile than a 15 percentile gain at the 80th percentile. Providing incentives for teachers to make their students learn more may encourage teachers to do so, but, perhaps more importantly, it will compensate them for the extra effort required to improve the skills that will help their students achieve. (Contains 1 figure.) (ERIC).
Anmerkungen	Hoover Institution. Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6010. Tel: 800-935-2882; Fax: 650-723-8626; e-mail: educationnext@hoover.stanford.edu; Web site: http://www.hoover.org/publications/ednext
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10