Literaturnachweis - Detailanzeige
Autor/inn/en | Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel |
---|---|
Titel | Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment. |
Quelle | In: Psychological Review, 90 (1983) 4, S.293-315 |
Sprache | englisch |
Dokumenttyp | gedruckt; Zeitschriftenaufsatz |
Schlagwörter | Stellungnahme; Cognitive Processes; Error Patterns; Evaluative Thinking; Heuristics; Intuition; Probability; Theories |
Abstract | Judgments under uncertainty are often mediated by intuitive heuristics that are not bound by the conjunction rule of probability. Representativeness and availability heuristics can make a conjunction appear more probable than one of its constituents. Alternative interpretations of this conjunction fallacy are discussed and attempts to combat it are explored. (Author/BW) |
Erfasst von | ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC |