Bias in Confidence: A Critical Test for Discrete-State Models of Change Detection

Autor/inn/en	Winiger, Samuel; Singmann, Henrik; Kellen, David
Titel	Bias in Confidence: A Critical Test for Discrete-State Models of Change Detection
Quelle	In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 47 (2021) 3, S.387-401 (15 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Zusatzinformation	ORCID (Winiger, Samuel)
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0278-7393
DOI	10.1037/xlm0000959
Schlagwörter	Visual Perception; Short Term Memory; Recognition (Psychology); Models; Bias; Change; Task Analysis; Evaluative Thinking; Metacognition + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Visuelle Wahrnehmung; Kurzzeitgedächtnis; Recognition; Wiedererkennen; Analogiemodell; Wandel; Aufgabenanalyse; Meta cognitive ability; Meta-cognition; Metakognitive Fähigkeit; Metakognition
Abstract	Ongoing discussions on the nature of storage in visual working memory have mostly focused on 2 theoretical accounts: On one hand we have a discrete-state account, postulating that information in working memory is supported with high fidelity for a limited number of discrete items by a given number of "slots," with no information being retained beyond these. In contrast with this all-or-nothing view, we have a continuous account arguing that information can be degraded in a continuous manner, reflecting the amount of resources dedicated to each item. It turns out that the core tenets of this discrete-state account constrain the way individuals can express confidence in their judgments, excluding the possibility of biased confidence judgments. Importantly, these biased judgments are expected when assuming a continuous degradation of information. We report 2 studies showing that biased confidence judgments can be reliably observed, a behavioral signature that rejects a large number of discrete-state models. Finally, complementary modeling analyses support the notion of a mixture account, according to which memory-based confidence judgments (in contrast with guesses) are based on a comparison between graded, fallible representations, and response criteria. (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	American Psychological Association. Journals Department, 750 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20002. Tel: 800-374-2721; Tel: 202-336-5510; Fax: 202-336-5502; e-mail: order@apa.org; Web site: http://www.apa.org
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2024/1/01