The Trajectory of Counterfactual Simulation in Development

Autor/inn/en	Kominsky, Jonathan F.; Gerstenberg, Tobias; Pelz, Madeline; Sheskin, Mark; Singmann, Henrik; Schulz, Laura; Keil, Frank C.
Titel	The Trajectory of Counterfactual Simulation in Development
Quelle	In: Developmental Psychology, 57 (2021) 2, S.253-268 (16 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Zusatzinformation	ORCID (Kominsky, Jonathan F.) ORCID (Gerstenberg, Tobias) ORCID (Pelz, Madeline) ORCID (Singmann, Henrik)
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0012-1649
DOI	10.1037/dev0001140
Schlagwörter	Simulation; Children; Age Differences; Child Development; Cognitive Processes; Cognitive Development; Logical Thinking; Connecticut; United States; New Jersey (Newark) + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Simulation program; Simulationsprogramm; Child; Kind; Kinder; Age; Difference; Age difference; Altersunterschied; Kindesentwicklung; Cognitive process; Kognitiver Prozess; Kognitive Entwicklung; USA
Abstract	Young children often struggle to answer the question "what would have happened?" particularly in cases where the adult-like "correct" answer has the same outcome as the event that actually occurred. Previous work has assumed that children fail because they cannot engage in accurate counterfactual simulations. Children have trouble considering what to change and what to keep fixed when comparing counterfactual alternatives to reality. However, most developmental studies on counterfactual reasoning have relied on binary yes/no responses to counterfactual questions about complex narratives and so have only been able to document when these failures occur but not why and how. Here, we investigate counterfactual reasoning in a domain in which specific counterfactual possibilities are very concrete: simple collision interactions. In Experiment 1, we show that 5- to 10-year-old children (recruited from schools and museums in Connecticut) succeed in making predictions but struggle to answer binary counterfactual questions. In Experiment 2, we use a multiple-choice method to allow children to select a specific counterfactual possibility. We find evidence that 4- to 6-year-old children (recruited online from across the United States) do conduct counterfactual simulations, but the counterfactual possibilities younger children consider differ from adult-like reasoning in systematic ways. Experiment 3 provides further evidence that young children engage in simulation rather than using a simpler visual matching strategy. Together, these experiments show that the developmental changes in counterfactual reasoning are not simply a matter of whether children engage in counterfactual simulation but also how they do so. (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2024/1/01