Is There a Need for Transcendental Arguments in Discourse Ethics?

Autor/in	Johnston, James Scott
Titel	Is There a Need for Transcendental Arguments in Discourse Ethics?
Quelle	In: Educational Theory, 66 (2016) 6, S.719-734 (16 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0013-2004
Schlagwörter	Ethics; Persuasive Discourse; Theories; Education; Philosophy + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Ethik; Persuasion; Persuasive Kommunikation; Theory; Theorie; Bildung; Erziehung; Philosophie
Abstract	In this essay, James Scott Johnston examines Jürgen Habermas's transcendental justification of his discourse theory of morality. According to Johnston, the application of Habermas's theory to educational issues often assumes that this justification is a cogent one. However, if the theory is to provide reasoned and appropriate guidance for educators, the justification of discourse ethics requires closer examination. Johnston argues that Habermas's so-called "weak" transcendental approach is in fact unsustainable because it fails to reconcile two conflicting schools of philosophical thought: Kant's transcendental idealism and George Herbert Mead's social pragmatism. Johnston concludes that a more plausible justification of the discourse ethical project can be achieved by rejecting Habermas's Kantianism and appealing solely to Mead's social pragmatic conception of rationality. (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2020/1/01