A Ranking-Theoretic Approach to Conditionals

Autor/in	Spohn, Wolfgang
Titel	A Ranking-Theoretic Approach to Conditionals
Quelle	In: Cognitive Science, 37 (2013) 6, S.1074-1106 (33 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0364-0213
DOI	10.1111/cogs.12057
Schlagwörter	Beliefs; Language Usage; Form Classes (Languages); Semantics; Theories; Ethics; Attribution Theory; Probability + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Belief; Glaube; Sprachgebrauch; Analytischer Sprachbau; Semantik; Theory; Theorie; Ethik; Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung; Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie
Abstract	Conditionals somehow express conditional beliefs. However, conditional belief is a bi-propositional attitude that is generally not truth-evaluable, in contrast to unconditional belief. Therefore, this article opts for an expressivistic semantics for conditionals, grounds this semantics in the arguably most adequate account of conditional belief, that is, ranking theory, and dismisses probability theory for that purpose, because probabilities cannot represent belief. Various expressive options are then explained in terms of ranking theory, with the intention to set out a general interpretive scheme that is able to account for the most variegated usage of conditionals. The Ramsey test is only the first option. Relevance is another, familiar, but little understood item, which comes in several versions. This article adds a further family of expressive options, which is able to subsume also counterfactuals and causal conditionals, and indicates at the end how this family allows for partial recovery of truth conditions for conditionals. (As Provided).
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Update	2017/4/10