Literaturnachweis - Detailanzeige
Autor/inn/en | Antonovics, Kate; Black, Sandra E.; Cullen, Julie Berry; Meiselman, Akiva Yonah |
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Institution | National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) |
Titel | Patterns, Determinants, and Consequences of Ability Tracking: Evidence from Texas Public Schools. Working Paper 30370 |
Quelle | (2022)
PDF als Volltext |
Sprache | englisch |
Dokumenttyp | gedruckt; online; Monographie |
Schlagwörter | Public Schools; Academic Ability; Track System (Education); Grade 4; Grade 5; Grade 6; Grade 7; Grade 8; Ability Grouping; Classification; Educational Policy; Accountability; Student Mobility; High Achievement; Low Achievement; Equal Education; Texas Public school; Öffentliche Schule; Leistungsgruppe; Leistungsdifferenzierung; School year 04; 4. Schuljahr; Schuljahr 04; School year 05; 5. Schuljahr; Schuljahr 05; School year 06; 6. Schuljahr; Schuljahr 06; School year 07; 7. Schuljahr; Schuljahr 07; School year 08; 8. Schuljahr; Schuljahr 08; Homogene Gruppierung; Niveaugruppierung; Streaming; Classification system; Klassifikation; Klassifikationssystem; Politics of education; Bildungspolitik; Verantwortung; Student; Students; Mobility; Schüler; Schülerin; Studentin; Mobilität; Unterdurchschnittliche Leistung |
Abstract | Schools often track students to classes based on ability. Proponents of tracking argue it is a low-cost tool to improve learning since instruction is more effective when students are more homogeneous, while opponents argue it exacerbates initial differences in opportunities without strong evidence of efficacy. In fact, little is known about the pervasiveness or determinants of ability tracking in the US. To fill this gap, we use detailed administrative data from Texas to estimate the extent of tracking within schools for grades 4 through 8 over the years 2011-2019. We find substantial tracking; tracking within schools overwhelms any sorting by ability that takes place across schools. The most important determinant of tracking is heterogeneity in student ability, and schools operationalize tracking through the classification of students into categories such as gifted and disabled and curricular differentiation. When we examine how tracking changes in response to educational policies, we see that schools decrease tracking in response to accountability pressures. Finally, when we explore how exposure to tracking correlates with student mobility in the achievement distribution, we find positive effects on high-achieving students with no negative effects on low-achieving students, suggesting that tracking may increase inequality by raising the ceiling. (As Provided). |
Anmerkungen | National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org |
Erfasst von | ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC |
Update | 2024/1/01 |