Expertise and Independence on Governing Boards: Evidence from School Districts. CEPA Working Paper No. 18-21

Autor/inn/en	Shi, Ying; Singleton, John D.
Institution	Stanford Center for Education Policy Analysis (CEPA)
Titel	Expertise and Independence on Governing Boards: Evidence from School Districts. CEPA Working Paper No. 18-21
Quelle	(2018), (42 Seiten) PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Boards of Education; Expertise; School Districts; Professional Autonomy; Teachers; Principals; Superintendents; Administrators; Elections; California + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Ausschuss; Expert appraisal; School district; Schulbezirk; Berufsfreiheit; Lehrer; Lehrerin; Lehrende; Principal; Schulleiter; Schulrat; Election; Wahl; Kalifornien
Abstract	In this paper, we study the role of expertise and independence on governing boards in the context of education. In particular, we examine the causal influence of professional educators elected to local school boards on education production. Educators may bring valuable human capital or experience to school district leadership, thereby improving student learning. Alternatively, the independence of educators may be distorted by interest groups. The key empirical challenge is that school board composition is endogenously determined through the electoral process. To overcome this, we develop and implement a novel research design that exploits California's randomized assignment of the order that candidates appear on election ballots. The insight of our empirical strategy is that ballot order effects generate quasi-random variation in the elected school board's composition. This approach is made possible by a unique dataset that combines election information about California school board candidates with district-level data on education inputs and outcomes. The results reveal that educators on the school board causally increase teacher salaries and reduce district enrollment in charter schools relative to other board members. We do not find accompanying effects on student test scores. We interpret these findings as consistent with educators on school boards shifting bargaining in favor of teachers' unions. (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	Stanford Center for Education Policy Analysis. 520 Galvez Mall, CERAS Building, 5th Floor, Stanford, CA 94305. Tel: 650-736-1258; Fax: 650-723-9931; e-mail: contactcepa@stanford.edu; Web site: http://cepa.stanford.edu
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2020/1/01