Who Chooses Incentivized Pay Structures? Exploring the Link between Performance and Preferences for Compensation Reform in the Teacher Labor Market. CEDR Working Paper. WP #2014-8

Autor/inn/en	Goldhaber, Dan; Bignell, Wes; Farley, Amy; Walch, Joe; Cowan, James
Institution	Center for Education Data & Research (CEDR)
Titel	Who Chooses Incentivized Pay Structures? Exploring the Link between Performance and Preferences for Compensation Reform in the Teacher Labor Market. CEDR Working Paper. WP #2014-8
Quelle	(2014), (47 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Preferences; Compensation (Remuneration); Incentives; Labor Market; Teacher Salaries; Decision Making; Finance Reform; Access to Information; Teacher Surveys; Teacher Attitudes; Models; Prediction; Teacher Effectiveness; Salary Wage Differentials; State Policy; State Regulation; Personnel Policy; Data Analysis; Public Schools; Elementary Secondary Education; Colorado + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Abfindung; Kompensation; Lohnausgleich; Anreiz; Labour market; Arbeitsmarkt; Lehrerbesoldung; Lehrervergütung; Decision-making; Entscheidungsfindung; Financial reform; Finanzreform; Lehrerverhalten; Analogiemodell; Vorhersage; Effectiveness of teaching; Instructional effectiveness; Lehrerleistung; Unterrichtserfolg; Staatliche Lenkung; Personalpolitik; Auswertung; Public school; Öffentliche Schule
Abstract	In this paper we report on research examining the revealed preferences of teachers in Denver Public Schools who were given the opportunity to select between remaining on a traditional salary schedule or opting in to one of the nation's highest profile pay reform systems, Denver's Professional Compensation System for Teachers. The incentive structure creates differential earnings risk for teachers according to their experience and measured effectiveness as well as their staffing assignment and school. We find that teachers are generally responsive to the eligibility criteria, but many teachers who would have earned more under the new system chose not to participate. Survey evidence suggests that teachers' notions of fairness and confusion about the structure of the new system may have contributed to these decisions. The following are appended: (1) ProComp Program Information; and (2) Survey Details. (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	Center for Education Data & Research. 3876 Bridge Way North Suite 201, Seattle, WA 98103. Tel: 206-547-5585; Fax: 206-547-1641; e-mail: cedr@uw.edu; Web site: http://www.cedr.us
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2020/1/01