Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result. NBER Working Paper No. 16140

Autor/inn/en	Pathak, Parag A.; Sethuraman, Jay
Institution	National Bureau of Economic Research
Titel	Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result. NBER Working Paper No. 16140
Quelle	(2010) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Urban Education; High School Students; Student Placement; Admission (School); Competitive Selection; Selective Admission; Methods; School Choice; New York + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Stadtteilbezogenes Lernen; High school; High schools; Student; Students; Oberschule; Schüler; Schülerin; Studentin; Schülerpraktikum; Bildungsselektion; Method; Methode; Choice of school; Schulwahl
Abstract	This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indifferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifies and unifies all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms--Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment--are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem. (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10