Holding Accountability to Account: How Scholarship and Experience in Other Fields Inform Exploration of Performance Incentives in Education. Working Paper 2008-04 Paper prepared for "Performance Incentives: Their Growing Impact on American K-12 Education" (Nashville, TN, Feb 28-29, 2008).

Autor/in	Rothstein, Richard
Institution	Vanderbilt University, National Center on Performance Incentives
Titel	Holding Accountability to Account: How Scholarship and Experience in Other Fields Inform Exploration of Performance Incentives in Education. Working Paper 2008-04 Paper prepared for "Performance Incentives: Their Growing Impact on American K-12 Education" (Nashville, TN, Feb 28-29, 2008).
Quelle	(2008), (104 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Zusatzinformation	Weitere Informationen
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Accountability; Public Sector; Job Performance; Incentives; Merit Pay; Performance Based Assessment; Statistical Analysis; Context Effect; Decision Making; Cheating; Deception; Negative Attitudes; Expectation; Definitions; Outcomes of Education; Private Sector; Motivation; Job Training; Outcome Based Education; High Stakes Tests; Test Coaching; Teachers; Improvement Programs; Program Effectiveness + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Verantwortung; Öffentlicher Sektor; Work performance; Arbeitsleistung; Anreiz; Leistungszulage; Leistungsermittlung; Statistische Analyse; Decision-making; Entscheidungsfindung; Prellen; Täuschung; Negative Fixierung; Expectancy; Erwartung; Begriffsbestimmung; Lernleistung; Schulerfolg; Privater Sektor; psychologische; Motivation (psychologisch); Berufsqualifizierender Bildungsgang; Lernerfolgsmessung; Testverfahren; Lehrer; Lehrerin; Lehrende; Effizienzsteigerung
Abstract	Accountability and performance incentive plans in education are compromised by goal distortion, gaming, and corruption. Education policy makers who design such plans have paid insufficient attention to similar experiences in other fields. This paper describes institutions in health care, job training and welfare administration, and in the private sector, that employ performance incentive systems, and the perverse consequences that follow. Because of such consequences, in the private sector performance incentives rely primarily on subjective evaluations, not easily corrupted quantitative measurements. In the public sector and service professions like teaching, performance incentives run the risk of subverting the intrinsic motivation of agents. The paper notes, however, that despite goal distortion, gaming, and corruption, performance incentive plans may nonetheless improve average performance on measured dimensions. A bibliography is included. (Contains 249 endnotes.) (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	National Center on Performance Incentives. Peabody College of Vanderbilt University, PMB #43, 230 Appleton Place, Nashville, TN 37203. Tel: 615-322-5538; Fax: 615-322-6018; e-mail: ncpi@vanderbilt.edu; Web site: http://www.performanceincentives.org
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10