Teacher Incentives in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from India. Working Paper 2008-13 Paper prepared for "Performance Incentives: Their Growing Impact on American K-12 Education" (Nashville, TN, Feb 29, 2008).

Autor/inn/en	Muralidharan, Karthik; Sundararaman, Venkatesh
Institution	Vanderbilt University, National Center on Performance Incentives
Titel	Teacher Incentives in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from India. Working Paper 2008-13 Paper prepared for "Performance Incentives: Their Growing Impact on American K-12 Education" (Nashville, TN, Feb 29, 2008).
Quelle	(2008), (56 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Foreign Countries; Developing Nations; Incentives; Teacher Motivation; Merit Pay; Job Performance; Student Evaluation; Language Tests; Mathematics Tests; Scores; Educational Objectives; Outcomes of Education; Academic Achievement; Program Effectiveness; Cost Effectiveness; India + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Ausland; Developing country; Developing countries; Entwicklungsland; Anreiz; Leistungszulage; Work performance; Arbeitsleistung; Schulnote; Studentische Bewertung; Language test; Sprachtest; Educational objective; Bildungsziel; Erziehungsziel; Lernleistung; Schulerfolg; Schulleistung; Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse; Kosten-Nutzen-Denken; Indien
Abstract	Performance pay for teachers is frequently suggested as a way of improving educational outcomes in schools, but the empirical evidence to date on its effectiveness is limited and mixed. We present results from a randomized evaluation of a teacher incentive program implemented across a representative sample of government-run rural primary schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The program provided bonus payments to teachers based on the average improvement of their students' test scores in independently administered learning assessments (with a mean bonus of 3% of annual pay). Students in incentive schools performed significantly better than those in control schools by 0.19 and 0.12 standard deviations in math and language tests respectively. They scored significantly higher on "conceptual" as well as "mechanical" components of the tests suggesting that the gains in test scores represented an actual increase in learning outcomes. Incentive schools also performed better on subjects for which there were no incentives. We find no significant difference in the effectiveness of group versus individual teacher incentives. Incentive schools performed significantly better than other randomly-chosen schools that received additional schooling inputs of a similar value. Appended are: (1) Project Timeline and Activities; and (2) Project Team, Test Administration, and Robustness to Cheating. (Contains 17 tables, 6 figures, and 53 footnotes.) (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	National Center on Performance Incentives. Peabody College of Vanderbilt University, PMB #43, 230 Appleton Place, Nashville, TN 37203. Tel: 615-322-5538; Fax: 615-322-6018; e-mail: ncpi@vanderbilt.edu; Web site: http://www.performanceincentives.org
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10