Literaturnachweis - Detailanzeige
Autor/inn/en | Glazerman, Steven; Protik, Ali; Teh, Bing-ru; Bruch, Julie; Max, Jeffrey |
---|---|
Institution | National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance (ED) |
Titel | Transfer Incentives for High-Performing Teachers: Final Results from a Multisite Randomized Experiment. NCEE 2014-4004 |
Quelle | (2013), (243 Seiten)
PDF als Volltext (1); PDF als Volltext (2) |
Zusatzinformation | Weitere Informationen |
Sprache | englisch |
Dokumenttyp | gedruckt; online; Monographie |
Schlagwörter | Quantitative Daten; Resource Allocation; Student Characteristics; Teacher Attendance; Cost Effectiveness; Mentors; Student Placement; Principals; Teacher Placement; Teamwork; Middle Schools; Elementary Schools; Program Implementation; Disadvantaged Schools; Teacher Persistence; Program Effectiveness; Reading Achievement; Mathematics Achievement; Teacher Recruitment; Teacher Influence; Teacher Competencies; School Districts; Achievement Gains; Low Achievement; Scores; Intervention; Educational Policy; Teacher Transfer; Incentives; Teacher Effectiveness; Spanish Speaking; Standardized Tests; At Risk Students Ressourcenallokation; Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse; Kosten-Nutzen-Denken; Schülerpraktikum; Principal; Schulleiter; Middle school; Mittelschule; Mittelstufenschule; Elementary school; Grundschule; Volksschule; Leseleistung; Mathmatics sikills; Mathmatics achievement; Mathematical ability; Mathematische Kompetenz; Lehrerrekrutierung; Lehrkunst; School district; Schulbezirk; Achievement gain; Leistungssteigerung; Unterdurchschnittliche Leistung; Politics of education; Bildungspolitik; Lehrerversetzung; Anreiz; Effectiveness of teaching; Instructional effectiveness; Lehrerleistung; Unterrichtserfolg; Standadised tests; Standardisierter Test |
Abstract | One way to improve struggling schools' access to effective teachers is to use selective transfer incentives. Such incentives offer bonuses for the highest-performing teachers to move into schools serving the most disadvantaged students. In this report, we provide evidence from a randomized experiment that tested whether such a policy intervention can improve student test scores and other outcomes in low-achieving schools. The intervention, known to participants as the Talent Transfer Initiative (TTI), was implemented in 10 school districts in seven states. The highest-performing teachers in each district--those who ranked in roughly the top 20 percent within their subject and grade span in terms of raising student achievement year after year (an approach known as value added)--were identified. These teachers were offered $20,000, paid in installments over a two-year period, if they transferred into and remained in designated schools that had low average test scores. The main findings from the study include: (1) The transfer incentive successfully attracted high value-added teachers to fill targeted vacancies; (2) The transfer incentive had a positive impact on test scores (math and reading) in targeted elementary classrooms; and (3) The transfer incentive had a positive impact on teacher-retention rates during the payout period; retention of the high-performing teachers who transferred was similar to their counterparts in the fall immediately after the last payout. Seven appendixes are included: (1) Supplemental Materials for Chapters I and II; (2) Value-Added Analysis to Identify Highest-Performing Teachers; (3) Supplemental Materials for Chapter III; (4) Identification of Focal Teachers; (5) Supplemental Materials for Chapter IV; (6) Supplemental Materials for Chapter V; and (7) Supplemental Materials for Chapter VI. (Contains 114 footnotes, 61 figures, and 92 tables.) [For the executive summary, see ED544268.] (ERIC). |
Anmerkungen | National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance. Available from: ED Pubs. P.O. Box 1398, Jessup, MD 20794-1398. Tel: 877-433-7827; Web site: http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/ |
Erfasst von | ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC |
Update | 2017/4/10 |