Agency Theory, Incentives, and Student Loans.

Autor/in	Rudner, Lawrence M.
Titel	Agency Theory, Incentives, and Student Loans.
Quelle	(1991), (19 Seiten) PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Academic Persistence; Accountability; Federal Aid; Federal Government; Financial Support; Government Role; Incentives; Postsecondary Education; Proprietary Schools; School Holding Power; Vocational Schools + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Verantwortung; Bundesregierung; Finanzielle Förderung; Anreiz; Post-secondary education; Tertiäre Bildung; Vocational school; Berufsbildende Schule; Berufsschule; Fachschule
Abstract	Using agency theory, this paper analyzes schools, particularly career schools, in the Stafford Loan Program for student incentive to graduate and pay off their loans. Agency theory focuses on the roles of information and incentives when a principal and an agent cooperate with respect to the utilization of resources. The analysis examines the incentives provided by the principal, the Federal Government, for its agent, the career school. The financial structure of a school and the current financial aid program are modeled and show that the student loan programs can cost approximately $120,000 per 100-student school annually. This analysis also shows that the current system encourages schools not to be selective, not to exert any special recruitment effort, and to increase their capacity to enroll large numbers of students they believe are unqualified. An alternative structure is shown using agency theory and introducing parameter values that maximize both the agent's and principal's interests. This system would reward schools for selection effort and minimize costs to the government. A numerical example of the alternative structure applied to a hypothetical school is included. Also included are 13 references and 1 table. (JB)
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC