Reinstatement, Floating Conclusions, and the Credulity of Mental Model Reasoning

Autor/in	Bonnefon, Jean-Francois
Titel	Reinstatement, Floating Conclusions, and the Credulity of Mental Model Reasoning
Quelle	In: Cognitive Science, 28 (2004) 4, S.621-631 (11 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0364-0213
DOI	10.1016/j.cogsci.2004.03.002
Schlagwörter	Models; Logical Thinking; Pragmatics; Prediction; Theories; Intuition; Thinking Skills + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Analogiemodell; Pragmalinguistik; Vorhersage; Theory; Theorie; Denkfähigkeit
Abstract	Johnson-Laird and coworkers' Mental Model theory of propositional reasoning is shown to be somewhere in between what logicians have defined as "credulous" and "skeptical" with respect to the conclusions it draws on default reasoning problems. It is then argued that in situations where skeptical reasoning has been shown to lead to problematic conclusions due to not being skeptical enough, the bolder Mental Model theory will likewise make counterintuitive predictions. This claim is supported by the consideration of two of those situations, namely problems involving reinstatement and floating conclusions. It is discussed how the recent "principle of pragmatic modulation" could be a first step in order to overcome the mild credulity of Mental Model reasoning. (Author).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10