Risk Aversion and Support for Merit Pay: Theory and Evidence from Minnesota's Q Comp Program

Autor/inn/en	Nadler, Carl; Wiswall, Matthew
Titel	Risk Aversion and Support for Merit Pay: Theory and Evidence from Minnesota's Q Comp Program
Quelle	In: Education Finance and Policy, 6 (2011) 1, S.75-104 (30 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	1557-3060
DOI	10.1162/EDFP_a_00023
Schlagwörter	Risk; Merit Pay; Teacher Salaries; Resistance (Psychology); Models; Prediction; Minnesota + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Risiko; Leistungszulage; Lehrerbesoldung; Lehrervergütung; Resistenz; Analogiemodell; Vorhersage
Abstract	Recent research attributes the lack of merit pay in teaching to the resistance of teachers. This article examines whether the structure of merit pay affects the types of teachers who support it. We develop a model of the relative utility teachers receive from merit pay versus the current fixed schedule of raises. We show that if teachers are risk averse, teachers with higher base salaries would be more likely to support a merit pay program that allows them to keep their current base salary and risk only future salary increases. We test the predictions of the model using data from a new merit pay program, the Minnesota Q Comp program, which requires the approval of the teachers in each school district. Consistent with the model's predictions, we find that districts with higher base salaries and a higher proportion of teachers with master's degrees are more likely to approve merit pay. (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10