The Price of Admission: Who Gets into Private School, and How Much Do They Pay?

Autor/in	Walton, Nina
Titel	The Price of Admission: Who Gets into Private School, and How Much Do They Pay?
Quelle	In: Economics of Education Review, 29 (2010) 5, S.738-750 (13 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0272-7757
DOI	10.1016/j.econedurev.2010.04.004
Schlagwörter	Private Schools; Economics; Economic Factors; Educational Finance; Educational Policy; Policy Analysis; Access to Education; Costs; Admission Criteria; Selective Admission; Competitive Selection; High Achievement; Family Financial Resources; Social Responsibility + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Private school; Privatschule; Volkswirtschaftslehre; Ökonomischer Faktor; Bildungsfonds; Politics of education; Bildungspolitik; Politikfeldanalyse; Education; Access; Bildung; Zugang; Bildungszugang; Cost; Kosten; Admission; Admission procedures; Zulassungsbedingung; Zulassungsverfahren; Zulassung; Bildungsselektion; Soziale Verantwortung
Abstract	I analyze how elementary and secondary private schools decide which students to admit from their applicant pool using mechanism design theory. The problem for an individual private school of who to admit and how much to charge in tuition, is complicated by the existence of peer-effects: the value students place on attending school is increasing with the average ability of the entire class at that school. This feature, coupled with the fact that students can always attend public school for free, places constraints on the types of classes the private school can admit. In my model, students have an ability type that is known to the school through testing, as well as a wealth type that is private information. Students report their wealth to the school and on the basis of the results from the ability test and wealth reports, the school institutes an allocation rule and a payment rule. Allocation rules which only admit all high ability students and no others, or all high wealth students and no others are not feasible. I utilize a simple example to show how in a revenue-maximizing allocation, the private school always under-admits the highest ability students relative to the allocation rule that maximizes social welfare. (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10