Education Management and Performance after Rural Education Finance Reform: Evidence from Western China

Autor/inn/en	Liu, Mingxing; Murphy, Rachel; Tao, Ran; An, Xuehui
Titel	Education Management and Performance after Rural Education Finance Reform: Evidence from Western China
Quelle	In: International Journal of Educational Development, 29 (2009) 5, S.463-473 (11 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0738-0593
DOI	10.1016/j.ijedudev.2009.04.013
Schlagwörter	Rural Schools; Incentives; Finance Reform; Educational Finance; Educational Quality; Educational Change; Foreign Countries; Rural Education; Educational Administration; Surveys; School Districts; Politics of Education; Outcomes of Education; Power Structure; Educational Policy; Government Role; Educational Principles; Change Strategies; Educational Development; Centralization; Organizational Change; Administrative Change; Teacher Salaries; Educational Environment; China + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Rural area; Rural areas; School; Schools; Ländlicher Raum; Schule; Schulen; Anreiz; Financial reform; Finanzreform; Bildungsfonds; Quality of education; Bildungsqualität; Bildungsreform; Ausland; Ländliche Erwachsenenbildung; Bildungsverwaltung; Schuladministration; Schulverwaltung; Survey; Umfrage; Befragung; School district; Schulbezirk; Educational policy; Bildungspolitik; Lernleistung; Schulerfolg; Politics of education; Bildungsprinzip; Lösungsstrategie; Bildungsentwicklung; Centralisation; Zentralisierung; Organisationswandel; Lehrerbesoldung; Lehrervergütung; Lernumgebung; Pädagogische Umwelt; Schulumwelt
Abstract	Based on a survey of rural school districts in Western China, this essay explores the effects of fiscal centralisation on the relationship between local governance and school district management, most particularly on how managerial power is distributed in the rural education sector. The essay also examines some of the possible effects that changes in managerial arrangements may have on teacher incentives and on educational quality as measured by student test scores. Our analysis suggests that teachers' incentives and students' education performance are unlikely to benefit from the excessive centralisation of decision-making power or from incessant horizontal level power struggles among different government bodies. (Contains 1 figure and 10 tables.) (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10