Literaturnachweis - Detailanzeige
Autor/inn/en | Garratt, Rod; Marshall, John M. |
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Titel | Optimum College Admissions, Taxes and Tuitions When Completion Is Uncertain. |
Quelle | In: Education Economics, 3 (1995) 3, S.219-34Infoseite zur Zeitschrift |
Sprache | englisch |
Dokumenttyp | gedruckt; Zeitschriftenaufsatz |
ISSN | 0964-5292 |
Schlagwörter | Quantitative Daten; Academic Achievement; Admission Criteria; College Admission; Consumer Economics; Educational Economics; Educational Finance; Family Characteristics; Higher Education; Insurance; Parent Aspiration; Paying for College; Statistical Analysis |
Abstract | Explores the rationale for college subsidies in most world economies, treating precollege achievement as an insurable risk. Contract theory considers optimum insurance contracts for this risk and views public finance of college education as providing the insurance. The theory yields conditions on optimum taxes and fees. Rationing by ability/achievement occurs at the margin between matriculating and not matriculating. (16 references) (MLH) |
Erfasst von | ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC |