Individual Teacher Incentives, Student Achievement and Grade Inflation

Autor/in	Martins, Pedro S.
Institution	Centre for the Economics of Education
Titel	Individual Teacher Incentives, Student Achievement and Grade Inflation
Quelle	(2010), (43 Seiten) PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
ISSN	2045-6557
Schlagwörter	Control Groups; Grade Inflation; Incentives; Academic Achievement; Educational Change; Foreign Countries; Change Strategies; Merit Pay; Robustness (Statistics); Educational Trends; Trend Analysis; Predictor Variables; Private Schools; Teacher Retirement; Comparative Analysis; Program Effectiveness; Portugal + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Anreiz; Schulleistung; Bildungsreform; Ausland; Lösungsstrategie; Leistungszulage; Widerstandsfähigkeit; Bildungsentwicklung; Trendanalyse; Prädiktor; Private school; Privatschule
Abstract	There is great interest in understanding the potential of teacher incentives to improve student achievement. In fact, teacher incentives, either individual or collective, may improve student achievement if they succeed in aligning the public or social goals with the goals of the teacher. However, an approach in which reward is based on outputs can also be fraught with difficulties: For instance, setting specific measurable outputs may lead to potentially dysfunctional behaviour such as teaching to test. Moreover, while individual incentives may disrupt collaborative work, collective incentives may also generate free riding and, in the end, little effect on performance. This paper sheds light into this question by examining the recent introduction of performance-related pay in all public schools in Portugal. The approach is based on a difference-in-differences analysis drawing on two complementary control groups. The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the main characteristics of the education reform studied in the paper and discusses some of its theoretical implications. Section 3 presents the data used in the paper, a matched school-student panel data set; Section 4 describes the main results, while Section 5 presents the robustness analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes. (Contains 4 figures, 9 tables and 14 footnotes.) (ERIC).
Anmerkungen	Centre for the Economics of Education. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK. Tel: +44-20-7955-7673; Fax: +44-20-7955-7595; e-mail: cee@lse.ac.uk; Web site: http://cee.lse.ac.uk
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10