Affirmative Action in Education: Evidence From Engineering College Admissions in India. NBER Working Paper No. 13926

Autor/inn/en	Bertrand, Marianne; Hanna, Rema; Mullainathan, Sendhil
Institution	National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Titel	Affirmative Action in Education: Evidence From Engineering College Admissions in India. NBER Working Paper No. 13926
Quelle	(2008) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Social Class; Negative Attitudes; Affirmative Action; Engineering Education; Foreign Countries; College Admission; Costs; Disadvantaged; Developing Nations; Program Effectiveness; Cost Effectiveness; Education Work Relationship; Access to Education; Employment Potential; Educational Benefits; Educational Policy; India + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Social classes; Soziale Klasse; Negative Fixierung; Ingenieurausbildung; Ausland; Hochschulzugang; Hochschulzulassung; Zulassung; Cost; Kosten; Developing country; Developing countries; Entwicklungsland; Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse; Kosten-Nutzen-Denken; Education; Access; Bildung; Zugang; Bildungszugang; Arbeitsmarktbezogene Qualifikation; Beschäftigungsfähigkeit; Bildungsertrag; Politics of education; Bildungspolitik; Indien
Abstract	Many countries mandate affirmative action in university admissions for traditionally disadvantaged groups. Little is known about either the efficacy or costs of these programs. This paper examines affirmative action in engineering colleges in India for "lower-caste" groups. We find that it successfully targets the financially disadvantaged: the marginal upper-caste applicant comes from a more advantaged background than the marginal lower-caste applicant who displaces him. Despite much lower entrance exam scores, the marginal lower-caste entrant does benefit: we find a strong, positive economic return to admission. These findings contradict common arguments against affirmative action: that it is only relevant for richer lower-caste members, or that those who are admitted are too unprepared to benefit from the education. However, these benefits come at a cost. Our point estimates suggest that the marginal upper-caste entrant enjoys nearly twice the earnings level gain as the marginal lower-caste entrant. This finding illustrates the program's redistributive nature: it benefits the poor, but costs resources in absolute terms. One reason for this lower level gain is that a smaller fraction of lower-caste admits end up employed in engineering or advanced technical jobs. Finally, we find no evidence that the marginal upper-caste applicant who is rejected due to the policy ends up with more negative attitudes towards lower castes or towards affirmative action programs. On the other hand, there is some weak evidence that the marginal lower-caste admits become stronger supporters of affirmative action programs. (As Provided).
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Update	2017/4/10