Contratos de rendimiento para administradores (Performance Contracts for Administrators). ERIC Digest.

Autor/in	Hertling, Elizabeth
Institution	ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, Eugene, OR.
Titel	Contratos de rendimiento para administradores (Performance Contracts for Administrators). ERIC Digest.
Quelle	(1999), (4 Seiten) PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei Verfügbarkeit
Reihe	ERIC Publications; ERIC Digests in Full Text
Sprache	spanisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Administrator Effectiveness; Educational Administration; Elementary Secondary Education; Instructional Leadership; Management by Objectives; Performance Contracts; Personnel Evaluation; School Administration; Superintendents + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Bildungsverwaltung; Schuladministration; Schulverwaltung; Instruction; Leadership; Bildung; Erziehung; Führung; Leistungsvereinbarung; Personalbeurteilung; Schulrat
Abstract	This digest in Spanish explores the strategy of paying school administrators based on performance contracts. A performance contract is an agreement between an administrator--typically a superintendent--and the school board that links the administrator's pay to indicators of job performance. Most commonly, performance contracts include bonuses for a job well done and, less often, salary decreases for poor performance. The digest examines which indicators, such as student achievement, should be used to evaluate administrators' performance, and it outlines the pros and cons of linking these indicators to performance. It discusses the reasons behind offering administrators performance contracts when other education employees are not compensated in this way. It details the potential benefits of performance contracts, such as the clarification of goals, the relative ease in dismissing a poorly performing administrator, and the symbolic demonstration of accountability that comes with such contracts. The final section of the digest outlines what critics say about performance contracts, particularly the worry that administrators will not be given the necessary resources to achieve their goals and the concern that if a larger paycheck is needed to motivate a superintendent then the problem may not be solvable through a contract. (RJM)
Anmerkungen	ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, 5207 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-5207. Tel: 541-346-5044; Tel: 800-438-8841 (Toll Free); Fax: 541-346-2334; Web site: http://eric.uoregon.edu. For full text: http://eric.uoregon.edu/publications/digests/spanish/digest127.html.
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC