Paradigms, Possibilities, and Probabilities: Comment on Hinterecker, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2016)

Autor/inn/en	Oaksford, Mike; Over, David; Cruz, Nicole
Titel	Paradigms, Possibilities, and Probabilities: Comment on Hinterecker, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2016)
Quelle	In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 45 (2019) 2, S.288-297 (10 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0278-7393
DOI	10.1037/xlm0000586
Schlagwörter	Stellungnahme; Models; Probability; Inferences; Logical Thinking; Prediction; Validity; Thinking Skills; Epistemology; Schemata (Cognition); Theories + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Analogiemodell; Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung; Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie; Inference; Inferenz; Vorhersage; Gültigkeit; Denkfähigkeit; Erkenntnistheorie; Cognition; Schema; Kognition; Theory; Theorie
Abstract	Hinterecker, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2016) compared the adequacy of the probabilistic new paradigm in reasoning with the recent revision of mental models theory (MMT) for explaining a novel class of inferences containing the modal term "possibly." For example, "the door is closed or the window is open or both," therefore, "possibly the door is closed and the window is open (A or B" or both, therefore, "possibly(A & B)"). They concluded that their results support MMT. In this comment, it is argued that Hinterecker et al. (2016) have not adequately characterized the theory of probabilistic validity (p-validity) on which the new paradigm depends. It is unclear how p-validity can be applied to these inferences, which are anyway peripheral to the theory. It is also argued that the revision of MMT is not well motivated and its adoption leads to many logical absurdities. Moreover, the comparison is not appropriate because these theories are defined at different levels of computational explanation. In particular, revised MMT lacks a provably consistent computational level theory that could justify treating these inferences as valid. It is further argued that the data could result from the noncolloquial locutions used to express the premises. Finally, an alternative pragmatic account is proposed based on the idea that a conclusion is possible if what someone knows cannot rule it out. This account could be applied to the unrevised mental model theory rendering the revision redundant. [To view the original article, "Modality, Probability, and Mental Models," see EJ1116059.] (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2020/1/01